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DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING AND THE 
LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE: UNSETTLING A 
SETTLED QUESTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Paul F. Straint 
Christina L. Gaardertt 
The learned intermediary doctrine provides that "a manufacturer 
of a prescription drug has a duty to warn only physicians, not patients, 
of potential risks associated with the use of the drug."1 This duty, also 
known as the patient-notice requirement, applies only to physicians 
because the doctor "is in the best position to understand the patient's 
needs and assess the risks and benefits of a particular course of treat-
ment."2 Many states adopted this legal theory,3 and section 6 of the 
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1. Hunt v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 547, 550 (D. Md. 1992). 
The learned intermediary theory has been applied to medical devices as 
well as prescription drugs. Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 
95 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that, under the learned intermediary doctrine, 
the manufacturer of a breast prosthesis had no duty to warn the consumer 
of possible risks associated with the product); see also infra notes 8-13 and 
accompanying text for the definition of the learned intermediary doctrine 
as it is set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts ("Restatement (Third)"). 
2. Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 95. A number of other theories have been raised sup-
porting the rationale of the learned intermediary doctrine. In West v. Searly 
& Co., 806 S.W.2d 608 (Ark. 1991), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that 
in many cases it would be almost impossible for a manufacturer to directly 
warn consumers and, furthermore, a duty to warn would interfere with the 
doctor-patient relationship. Id. at 613. Similarly, in Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 
P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988), the Supreme Court of California expressed concern 
that increasing the liability for manufacturers would drive up the cost of 
medication making it unaffordable to many patients. /d. at 479. See also 
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) oF ToRTS: PRooucrs LIABILI"IY § 6, cmt. b (1998) 
377 
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Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)'} pro-
vides for it as well. 4 The Restatement (Third)'s adoption of section 6, 
however, may place the learned intermediary doctrine in peril.5 In 
certain circumstances, section 6 the Restatement (Third) imposes the 
duty to warn patients of the risks associated with medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals on drug manufacturers, rather than doctors. 6 This 
change in the Restatement creates an environment more conducive to 
direct attacks on manufacturers under a duty to warn theory. In the 
Restatement (Third), the theory promulgated by this expanded patient-
notice requirement became an actuality when it was adopted by at 
least one jurisdiction. 7 
II. PATIENT NOTICE OFFERED BY THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
The learned intermediary doctrine, as set forth in section 6 of the 
Restatement (Third), provides that a manufacturer of prescription drugs 
or medical devices is subject to liability if its product is defective by 
virtue of a manufacturing defect, a design defect, or a failure to warn.8 
Section 6 also suggests that the manufacturer may have the duty to 
warn patients directly in some circumstances.9 Section 6, subsection 
(d) states: 
(explaining the rationale behind the learned intermediary doctrine) [here-
inafter REsTATEMENT (THIRD)]; Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed 
Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 Fooo DRuG 
CosM. LJ. 829, 830-31 (1991) (restating court-applied reasoning in support 
of the learned intermediary doctrine). 
3. See West, 806 S.W.2d at 613-14 (discussing that applying the learned inter-
mediary doctrine is appropriate in the case of oral contraceptives); Craft v. 
Peebles, 893 P.2d 138, 156 (Haw. 1995) (holding that the trial court prop-
erly instructed the jury under the learned intermediary doctrine that the 
manufacturer of breast implants did not have a duty to warn the con-
sumer); Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (conclud-
ing that under the learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer of 
Feldene was not strictly liable to the consumer for severe gastrointestinal 
bleeding caused by the prescription drug); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 
1032, 1042-45 (Kan. 1990) (holding that where the manufacturer of in-
trauterine devices ("IUDs") adequately warns a physician of risks associated 
with its use, the manufacturer is relieved of a duty to directly warn users of 
risks associated with its IUDs); Niemi era v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1117 
(NJ. 1989) (ruling that the learned intermediary doctrine relieved the 
manufacturer of liability from a childhood vaccine's dangerous effects). 
4. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 (1998). 
5. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
6. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(d); see also infra note 9 and accompanying 
text. 
7. See Perez v. Wyeth Lab. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1257 (NJ. 1999); see also infra 
notes 18-46 and accompanying text. 
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(a)-(b). 
9. See id. § 6, cmts. a-b. See also infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the duty to directly warn patients when the physician has a dimin-
ished role as a decision-maker). 
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A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe 
due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable in-
structions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm 
are not provided to ... the patient when the manufacturer knows 
or has reason to know that the health-care providers will not be in a 
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instruc-
tions or wamings.10 
379 
The Restatement (Third) bases its requirement that the manufacturer 
provide direct notification to the patient on the belief that the ratio-
nale for the learned intermediary doctrine is undercut in certain cir-
cumstances. 11 These circumstances include those in which there is a 
"limited therapeutic relationship" and "the physician or other health-
care provider has a much-diminished role as an evaluator or decision-
maker."12 The comments note that "[i]n these instances it may be 
appropriate to impose on the manufacturer the duty to warn the pa-
tient directly."13 
This Article examines one such example, direct-to-consumer adver-
tising, for which the Restatement (Third) suggests that courts "should 
consider" imposing tort liability on drug manufacturers who advertise 
a prescription drug and its indicated use through the media without 
providing direct warnings to consumers.14 
The Restatement (Third) recognizes that arguments exist both for and 
against imposing a duty on the manufacturer to warn patients. Propo-
nents favoring imposing a duty state that "manufacturers [who] com-
10. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(d) (emphasis added). The comments to subsec-
tion (d) further explain this duty by stating that "direct warnings and in-
structions to patients are warranted for drugs that are dispensed or 
administered to patients without the personal intervention or evaluation of 
a health-care provider." /d. § 6(d), cmt. e. 
11. /d. § 6, cmt. b. The comments to section 6 explain the rationale behind the 
learned intermediary rule, stating that "only health-care professionals are 
in a position to understand the significance of the risks involved and to 
assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given form of prescrip-
tion-based therapy." /d. See also supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of the rationale of the learned intermediary doctrine. 
12. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6, cmt. b. 
13. /d. 
14. See id. § 6, cmt. e. Comment e also indicates that manufacturers have a duty 
to warn patients in cases where "vaccines [are] administered en masse at 
public health clinics." /d. See, e.g., Brazzell v. United States, 788 F.2d 1352, 
1358-59 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding the government liable for failing to warn 
consumer of swine flu vaccine of prolonged muscle soreness as a possible 
side effect); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding 
the manufacturer of a polio vaccine liable for failing to warn consumers 
about the risk of contracting polio); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 399 F.2d 121, 130 
(9th Cir. 1968) (holding the same as the court in Givens). Another exam-
ple of where a manufacturer may be directly liable to the patient other than 
in direct-to-consumer advertising includes instances where government reg-
ulations so require. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6, cmt. e. Both of these 
topics are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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municate directly with consumers should not escape liability simply 
because the decision to prescribe the drug was made by the health-
care provider."15 Opponents, those supporting the traditional 
learned intermediary rule, however, argue that "notwithstanding di-
rect communications to the consumer, drugs cannot be dispensed un-
less a health-care provider makes an individualized decision that a 
drug is appropriate for a particular patient, and that it is for the 
health-care provider to decide which risks are relevant to a particular 
patient."16 
III. COURTS' APPLICATION OF SUBSECTION 6(d) (2) TO DI-
RECT TO- CONSUMER MARKETING CASES 
Several courts have considered whether the manufacturer has a 
duty and, thus, is liable for failing to warn patients under circum-
stances where it might seem that the health-care provider is not able 
to reduce the risk of harm in accordance with the drug's warnings. As 
provided for in the comments to section 6(d)(2), these courts are 
split. 17 
A. Adoption of the Patient-Notice Requirement: Perez v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries, Inc. 
Since the Restatement (Third)'s publication, at least one court, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, adopted the view that a manufacturer 
has a duty to warn consumers directly in instances where the manufac-
turer engaged in direct-to-consumer advertising. 18 
In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 19 the plaintiffs had contraceptive 
capsules, known as Norplant, implanted under the skin of their upper 
arms.20 The plaintiffs alleged that the pharmaceutical manufacturer 
engaged in a "massive advertising campaign" beginning in 1991 which 
included television commercials and print advertisements in women's 
magazines. 21 The plaintiffs complained that while the ads toted the 
benefits of the product, they did not warn about the side effects, 
which included weight gain, headaches, and a host of other difficul-
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6, cmt. e. 
16. /d. 
17. See infra notes 18-62 and accompanying text. 
18. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (NJ. 1999). Direct-to-
consumer advertising is the process by which manufacturers directly solicit 
end-users of its product. See Bradford B. Lear, The Learned Intennediary Doc-
trine in the Age of Direct Consumer Advertising, 65 Mo. L. REv. 1101, 1109 
(2000). 
19. 734 A.2d 1245 (NJ. 1999). 
20. /d. at 1247. 
21. /d. at 1248 (listing Glamour, Mademoiselle, and Cosmopolitan as various wo-
men's magazines that printed the advertisements). 
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ties while the product was implanted, and the subsequent pain and 
scarring accompanying the removal of the product.22 
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that the 
manufacturer was not liable for failing to warn them direcdy.23 It 
found that the plaintiffs failed to rebut New Jersey's statutory pre-
sumption that the manufacturer's warnings to the physician were 
adequate. 24 
The trial court was persuaded that, although the manufacturer mar-
keted directly to consumers, the learned intermediary doctrine still 
applied because "'a physician is not simply relegated to the role of 
prescribing the drug according to the woman's wishes."'25 Ultimately, 
the physician was the one responsible for weighing the risks and bene-
fits of the drug before prescribing it to a patient.26 The New Jersey 
Superior Court, Appellate Division upheld this decision. 27 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, reversed and re-
manded the case. 28 Describing the rising trend of direct-to-consumer 








ld. (enumerating all of the other side effects associated with the 
contraceptive). 
Id. at 1249 (citing Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 713 A.2d 588, 595 (NJ. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1997)). 
/d. at 1249. The New Jersey statute provides: 
In any product liability action the manufacturer or seller shall not 
be liable for harm caused by a failure to warn if the product con-
tains an adequate warning or instruction or, in the case of dangers 
a manufacturer or seller discovers or reasonably should discover 
after the product leaves its control, if the manufacturer or seller 
provides an adequate warning or instruction. An adequate product 
warning or instruction is one that a reasonably prudent person in 
the same or similar circumstances would have provided with re-
spect to the danger and that communicates adequate information 
on the dangers and safe use of the product, taking into account the 
characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, the per-
sons by whom the product is intended to be used, or in the case of 
prescription drugs, taking into account the characteristics of, and 
the ordinary knowledge common to, the prescribing physician. U 
the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or de-
vice or food or food additive has been approved or prescribed by 
the federal Food and Drug Administration under the "Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et 
seq. or the "Public Health Service Act," 58 Stat. 682, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 201 et seq., a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning 
or instruction is adequate. For purposes of this section, the terms 
"drug", "device", "food", and "food additive" have the meanings de-
fined in the "Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act." 
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000). 
Perez, 734 A.2d at 1249 (quoting Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 713 A.2d 588, 
594 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997)). 
/d. The trial court did not elaborate further as to why it was persuaded. See 
id. 
I d. 
/d. at 1264. 
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consumer advertising from 1995 to 1996,29 the court explained that 
the Restatement (Third) left it to "developing case law" to determine 
whether to create an exception to the learned intermediary rule for 
direct-to-consumer advertising.30 Therefore, to "develop the case 
law," the court announced an opinion regarding why the learned in-
termediary doctrine no longer applied, and why the manufacturer's 
duty still existed. 
1. Inapplicability of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising 
Accepting the invitation of the Restatement (Third), the Perez court 
examined the underpinnings of the learned intermediary doctrine 
and determined that its rationale did not support its application to 
direct-to-consumer advertising.31 The court identified four premises 
supporting its conclusion, including: 
(1) [R]eluctance to undermine the doctor patient-relation-
ship [sic]; (2) absence in the era of "doctor knows best" of 
need for the patient's informed consent; (3) inability of drug 
manufacturer to communicate with patients; and ( 4) com-
plexity of the subject. 32 
The court concluded that the era where these rationales applied was 
passed, noting that the "'Norman Rockwell image of the family doctor 
no longer exists.' "33 
The court found that "[i]nformed consent requires a patient-based 
decision rather than the paternalistic approach of the 1970s,"34 and 
that the patient now has a role in determining whether to use a partic-
ular drug.35 The court considered persuasive the fact that, as man-
aged care reduces the amount of time the doctor spends with the 
patient, "physicians have considerably less time to inform patients of 
the risks and benefits of a drug."36 Finally, the court found that the 
enormous amount of money that manufacturers spend on consumer 
advertising belied both the notion that manufacturers lacked a means 
29. /d. at 1251 (citing Bob Van Voris, Drug Ads Could Spell Legal Trouble Consumer 
Campaigns May Result in Greater Liability, NAT'L LJ., July 21, 1997, at B1). 
30. /d. at 1253 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6, cmt. b). 
31. /d. at 1256. 
32. /d. at 1255. 
33. /d. (quoting Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Drug Manufac-
turer to the Consumer, 40 Fooo DRuG CosM. LJ. 135, 136 (1985)). 
34. /d. at 1255 (citing Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504,507-08 (NJ. 1988) and 
discussing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1064 (1972)). 
35. /d. (citing Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Adver-
tising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 Fooo DRUG CosM. LJ. 829, 830-31 
(1991)). 
36. /d. (citing Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Faulty Warning Labels Add to Risk in Prescrip-
tion Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A27). 
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of communicating effectively with consumers, and the notion that pre-
scription drugs and medical devices were topics too complex for the 
consumer to understand. 37 
First, the fact that manufacturers are advertising their drugs 
and devices to consumers suggests that consumers are active 
participants in their health care decisions, invalidating the 
concept that it is the doctor, not the patient, who decides 
whether a drug or device should be used. Second, it is illogi-
cal that requiring manufacturers to provide direct warnings 
to a consumer will undermine the patient-physician relation-
ship, when, by its very nature, consumer-directed advertising 
encroaches on that relationship by encouraging consumers 
to ask for advertised products by name. Finally, consumer-
directed advertising rebuts the notion that prescription 
drugs and devices and their potential adverse effects are too 
complex to be effectively communicated to lay consumers. 
Because the [Food and Drug Administration] requires that 
prescription drug and device advertising carry warnings, the 
consumer may reasonably presume that the advertiser guar-
antees the adequacy of its warnings. Thus, the common law 
duty to warm [sic] the ultimate consumer should apply.38 
While rejecting application of the learned intermediary doctrine in 
cases of direct-to-consumer advertising, the court noted that the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) promulgated guidelines and regula-
tions to address the manufacturer's obligations when advertising 
pharmaceuticals directly to consumers. 39 The court held that "FDA 
regulations are pertinent in determining the nature and extent of any 
duty of care that should be imposed on pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers with respect to direct-to-consumer advertising."40 The manufac-
turer will be provided the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that it 
fulfilled its duty to warn the consumer directly if it complies with FDA 






!d. at 1255-56 (citing Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: 
Assessing the Regulatary and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REv. 141, 158 (1997), 
which stated that drug manufacturers spent $1.3 billion in 1998 on 
advertising). 
Id. at 1256. (quoting Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine to 
Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REv. 931, 956 (1993)). 
!d. at 1257-59. The FDA guidelines require that all advertisements for pre-
scription drugs include a brief summary of" 'side effects, contraindications, 
and effectiveness as shall be required in regulations .... "'· !d. at 1258 
(quoting 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(n)(3) (West 2000)). 
!d. at 1259. 
!d. 
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2. Physician Involvement Does Not Relieve the Manufacturer of 
Liability 
The court next considered whether the physician's involvement in 
prescribing the drug or medical device broke the chain of causation, 
such that any failure to warn on the part of the manufacturer could 
not be considered the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.42 
While calling this rationale "appealing," the court nonetheless found 
that the altered patient-physician relationship created by direct-to-
consumer advertising warranted a rule of law that enabled the con-
sumer to recover from the manufacturer. 43 The court stated that 
"[o]n balance, we believe that the patient's interest in reliable infor-
mation predominates over a policy interest that would insulate manu-
facturers."44 The court noted, however, that the manufacturer "may 
seek contribution, indemnity or exoneration because of the physi-
cian's deficient role in prescribing that drug."45 The court concluded 
by saying that: 
The direct marketing of drugs to consumers generates a cor-
responding duty requiring manufacturers to warn of defects 
in the product . . . . Given the presumptive defense that is 
afforded to pharmaceutical manufacturers that comply with 
FDA requirements, we believe that it is fair to reinforce the 
regulatory scheme by allowing, in the case of direct-to-con-
sumer marketing of drugs, patients deprived of reliable med-
ical information to establish that the misinformation was a 
substantial factor contributing to their use of a defective 
pharmaceutical product.46 
42. !d. at 1260. 
43. !d. at 1262-63. 
44. !d. at 1262. 
45. !d. at 1263. 
46. !d. This quote infers that the failure to warn creates the defect. See id. The 
Restatement (Third), however, lists the duty to warn, a manufacturing defect, 
and a design defect as three independent causes for a tort action in negli-
gence and strict liability. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) at Forward. See also, e.g., 
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A-58C-2 (West 2000); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTS 685-89 (5th ed. 1984). Many courts, 
however, also consider the failure to warn to be a type of design defect. See 
generally Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 934 F. Supp. '713, 718 (D. Md. 1996) 
("'[F]ailure to warn' or 'inadequate warning,' conveniently overlooks the 
fact that 'failure to warn' liability is merely a type of design defect."); 
Gosewisch v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 376, 379 (Ariz. 1987) ("[T]o 
establish a prima facie case of strict products liability based on informational 
defect [failure to warn], [plaintiff] had the burden of proving that ... lack 
of an adequate warning made [the product] defective and unreasonably 
dangerous .... ") (emphasis in original); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 
237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) ("'In order to prevent the 
product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to 
give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use.'") (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A, cmt. j). 
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B. The Patient-Notice Requirement Rejected: Polley and Presto 
In contrast to Perez, other courts have declined to impose liability on 
drug manufacturers in cases where the manufacturer engaged in di-
rect-to-consumer advertising. For instance, in Polley v. Ciba-Geigy 
Corp.,47 the plaintiff/consumer received a brochure from the manu-
facturer regarding his prescription drug, Clozaril. 48 In discussing the 
learned intermediary doctrine and the role of the manufacturer, the 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska stated: 
The learned intermediary rule carefully allocates the duties 
of educating physicians, on the one hand, and warning pa-
tients, on the other, of the risks inherent in prescription 
medicines . . . . How the physician communicates the 
medicine's dangers to the patient is the physician's own deci-
sion, and his or her independent duty. There is no legal sup-
port for imposing upon a drug manufacturer an "advisory" 
role in that decision.49 
While the Perez court rejected the notion that a patient could not 
understand the complexities of a drug or device, and no longer re-
quired the paternalistic role of the physician, the Polley court main-
tained that: 
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, eso-
teric in formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert, 
the prescribing physician can take into account the propensi-
ties of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his pa-
tient . . . . The choice he makes is an informed one, an 
individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge 
of both patient and palliative.50 
Similar to Polley, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Presto v. Sandoz 
Pharmaceutical Corp.,51 held that a drug manufacturer is not liable 
under a failure to warn theory so long as the warnings provided to the 
physician were adequate.52 In Presto, the plaintiffs brought an action 
for failure to warn as a result of the suicide of their adult son, Greg 
Presto.53 His physician, Dr. Warren, prescribed Clozaril to Presto to 
treat his mental illness. 54 The drug manufacturer, Sandoz 
47. 658 F. Supp. 420 (D. Alaska 1987). 
48. !d. at 421 (applying Alaska law). Clozaril is a prescription medicine in-
tended "for the management of severely ill patients who fail to respond 
adequately to standard antipsychotic drug treatment." PHYSICIANs' DEsK 
REFERENCE 2155 (55th ed. 2001). The drug should be used only in severe 
cases because of the significant risk of seizures associated with its use. !d. 
49. Polley, 658 F. Supp. at 421. 
50. !d. at 421-22 (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 
1974)). 
51. 487 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 
52. !d. at 73. 
53. !d. at 72. 
54. !d. 
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Pharmaceuticals, sent Presto a "pamphlet entitled 'Understanding 
Clozaril (clozapine) Therapy: A Guide for Patients and Their Fami-
lies.' "55 The pamphlet provided general information and answered 
some common questions about the drug, but failed to warn that ab-
rupt discontinuation of the drug could cause a recurrence of 
psychotic symptoms. 56 Although, the medication helped control 
Presto's mental illness, his doctor stopped prescribing Clozaril be-
cause of its undesired side effects.57 Presto committed suicide soon 
after. 58 
The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer, having informed the 
consumer about its drug through the pamphlet, had a duty to warn of 
the dangers associated with the drug. 5 9 The court applied the learned 
intermediary rule and held that the manufacturer had no duty to 
warn the consumer directly.60 Moreover, the court elaborated that 
the brochure did not alter the application of the intermediary rule 
because "the pamphlet covers only general issues concerning the 
drug, and as the [plaintiffs] relied on Dr. Warren to prescribe and 
supervise Presto's use of the drug, this theory of liability is without 
merit."61 Again, as in Polley, the Presto court found the physician's pa-
ternalistic role paramount in deciding whether the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine applied.62 
IV. FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE: ADOPTION OF EXCEP-
TIONS TO THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE 
Maryland appellate courts have never squarely addressed the 
learned intermediary doctrine, although federal courts, applying Ma-
ryland law, have consistently presumed that the doctrine is viable in 
Maryland.63 While the weight of authority strongly supports applica-
55. /d. at 73. 
56. /d. at 73-74. 
57. /d. at 72-73 (explaining that the doctor agreed to the Prestos' request that 
Clozaril be replaced with another drug because of its undesirable side 
effects). 
58. /d. at 72. 
59. /d. at 73-74. 
60. /d. at 73. 
61. /d. at 74. 
62. /d. at 73. 
63. The legal authority cited in federal cases for the proposition that Maryland 
law subscribes to the learned intermediary doctrine are traced to Nolan v. 
Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 520, 276 A.2d 36, 39 (1971). In Nolan, the plaintiff 
brought a negligence action against a physician for injecting her intrave-
nously with Sparine, or promazine hydrochloride, in a quantity so large 
that it should have been injected in her muscle. /d. at 518, 276 A.2d at 38. 
Gangrene set into the plaintiff's fingertips, resulting in their amputation. 
/d. In deciding whether the warnings given by the manufacturer regarding 
use of Sparine were sufficient to grant a directed verdict, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland noted that the instructions on the label and on an insert 
inside the package "fully discharged its duty to warn. The duty is to give a 
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tion of the learned intermediary theory in cases of direct-to-consumer 
advertising, any case to reach the Maryland appellate courts will pre-
sent an issue of first impression. 
Whether other courts addressing the issue will uphold the learned 
intermediary doctrine or create exceptions remains to be seen. The 
Second Circuit recently certified a question regarding the learned in-
termediary theory to the Connecticut Supreme Court, raising a similar 
issue to that raised in Perez.64 At this time, however, the New Jersey 
court's decision in Perez is an outlier in the abundant case law uphold-
ing the learned intermediary doctrine's use in manufacturer-failure to 
warn cases. As such, it seems unlikely to gain general acceptance in 
Maryland or in other jurisdictions in the near future. 
64. 
reasonable warning, not the best possible one." ld. at 520, 523, 276 A.2d at 
38, 40 (citations omitted). "Even in jurisdictions which have espoused the 
doctrine of strict liability, and Maryland has not, [the manufacturer's] 
warning would have protected it." Id. at 523, 276 A.2d at 40 (citations omit-
ted). See generally Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 866 F. Supp. 242, 248 (D. 
Md. 1994) ("Under the learned intermediary doctrine, recognized under 
Maryland law, the Red Cross had no obligation to warn .... ") (citations 
omitted); Hunt v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 547, 550 (D. Md. 
1992) ("Maryland courts have adopted the 'learned intermediary' rule 
under which a manufacturer of a prescription drug has a duty to warn only 
physicians, not patients, of potential risks associated with the use of the 
drug.") (citations omitted); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 
89, 94-95 (D. Md. 1989) ("Under Maryland law, manufacturers of prescrip-
tion drugs need only warn the prescribing physician and not the patient of 
risks ... associated with a prescription drug") (citations omitted). 
See Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 214 F.3d 73, 74 (2d Cir. 2000) (certifying the 
question of whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn consumers directly 
when it provides prescription drug samples, in this case Ansaid, an anti-
inflammatory drug, to physicians). 
